Google Cloud security signal
SetIamPolicy retains bounded member/role changes and grant/revoke direction from
audit policy deltas. Replacement policies are explicitly snapshots, not inferred
grants. Exact long resource/principal identifiers live in structured attributes
and still pass privacy detectors. Raw records remain off by default. See the
permission event catalogue and population matrix
for field population, supported audit shapes and rejection limits.
Bower forwards Security Command Center findings and high-value Cloud Audit Logs to Sentinel through one Pub/Sub subscription. It does not ship Cloud Logging wholesale.
What is forwarded
| Source | Selection |
|---|---|
| Cloud Audit Logs | Admin Activity entries whose method matches audit_methods (IAM policy changes, service account and key creation, custom roles, log sinks, buckets and exclusions, org policy, SCC notification changes, firewall changes, KMS key destruction, Workload Identity providers), plus any admin call denied with PERMISSION_DENIED |
| Security Command Center | state = "ACTIVE" AND -mute = "MUTED" AND (severity = "HIGH" OR severity = "CRITICAL") |
With organization_id set the sink covers the whole organisation and the SCC
notification config is created. Without it, a project sink is created and SCC is
skipped.
Events
eventType | eventCategory | eventAction | eventResult | Actor | Target |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
gcp_cloud_audit | administrative-activity | protoPayload.methodName | success for status 0, denied for 7 or 16, else failure | principalEmail (service accounts typed service) | resource.type, resourceName |
gcp_scc_finding | application-security | finding category | failure while ACTIVE, else success | — | resource type and name |
source.ipAddress is set only when callerIp is an address; values such as
private or gce-internal-ip go to the gcp.callerIp label. Labels carry
gcp.projectId, gcp.service, gcp.method, gcp.auditLog, gcp.findingClass,
gcp.state and similar fields. SCC severity maps to the Bower severity. A finding
that changes state is a new event; the same notification delivered twice is not.
Raw entries are not copied into events unless BOWER_INCLUDE_RAW_RECORDS=true.
Deploy
cd deploy/gcp
cp terraform.tfvars.example terraform.tfvars # set project, organisation and the agent identity
terraform init
terraform plan -out bower.plan
terraform apply bower.plan
The module creates:
- a topic and dead-letter topic whose message storage policy allows only
australia-southeast1andaustralia-southeast2(in-transit enforcement is left off because Cloud Logging and SCC publish through global endpoints); - a pull subscription (60 s ack deadline, 7-day retention, exponential retry,
dead-lettering after
max_delivery_attempts= 10) and a dead-letter subscription to inspect and replay messages; - the log sink and SCC notification config, each with publisher rights on the topic only;
roles/pubsub.subscriberon the subscription forsubscriber_member;- optionally a Workload Identity Federation pool for an agent that runs in AWS, so the same agent can read both clouds with its AWS role and no Google key.
Set BOWER_GCP_PUBSUB_ENDPOINT=https://australia-southeast1-pubsub.googleapis.com/
to use the Australian locational endpoint.
Run the agent
| Variable | Default | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
BOWER_GCP_SUBSCRIPTION | — | subscription Terraform output (projects/…/subscriptions/…). |
BOWER_GCP_PUBSUB_ENDPOINT | https://pubsub.googleapis.com/ | HTTPS only. |
GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS | — | Only for Workload Identity Federation: the external_account file from aws_credential_config_command. It holds no secret. |
BOWER_GCP_ALLOW_KEY_FILE | false | Service account key files and gcloud user credentials (authorized_user) are refused unless this is set (labs only). |
Other variables (BOWER_COLLECTOR_URL, BOWER_INGEST_TOKEN, BOWER_BATCH_SIZE,
BOWER_RETRY_SECONDS, BOWER_INCLUDE_RAW_RECORDS) are shared with the AWS source;
see AWS.
Credentials come from Application Default Credentials: GKE Workload Identity, the
service account attached to Cloud Run or Compute Engine, or Workload Identity
Federation. The agent implements ADC itself (Native AOT, no Google client library) in
the order Google's libraries use: GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS, the gcloud
application_default_credentials.json file, then the metadata server
(GCE_METADATA_HOST overrides it for emulators). Workload Identity Federation
supports file, URL and AWS (aws1, including IMDSv2) credential sources with optional
service account impersonation. Executable-sourced and X.509 certificate credential
configurations are refused. Token and IAM endpoints in a credential file must be HTTPS
on googleapis.com (or the file's universe_domain). Access tokens are cached in
memory until five minutes before expiry and are never logged or written to disk.
Delivery guarantees
- A message is acknowledged only after its event was accepted or rejected by policy.
- Backpressure sets the ack deadline to
BOWER_RETRY_SECONDS; Pub/Sub redelivers afterwards. The agent does not pull while the collector is unreachable. - Every pulled message is leased by elapsed time: on pull the agent extends its ack deadline from the subscription's 60 s to the 5-minute lease and renews it every 2.5 minutes until the message is acknowledged or released, including while earlier messages in the batch, translation, forwarding or 429 retries are still running. If a renewal fails or the deadline passes, work on that message stops and it is not acknowledged; Pub/Sub redelivers it and the collector deduplicates its deterministic event ids.
- Malformed messages get a zero ack deadline, so Pub/Sub retries them and moves them
to the dead-letter topic after
max_delivery_attempts. - Unsupported payloads (other log types) are acknowledged and dropped: default deny.
Pack
packs/gcp-security holds BWR-POL-GCP-AUDIT and BWR-POL-GCP-SCC, Sigma
detections for service account key creation, IAM policy changes, logging tampering
and denied admin calls, and samples. Build, sign and load it like the AWS pack. Both
cloud packs can be loaded together; use
deploy/privacy/cloud-identities.yaml to pseudonymise principal emails with HMAC.
Limits
- The Terraform module passes
terraform validate; it has not been applied by the Bower test suite. - Data Access audit logs are not selected by default (high volume). Add a filter clause if a specific service needs them.
- The agent cannot read the topic's storage policy with subscriber rights, so it logs a reminder at start-up instead of checking it.