AWS security signal
Bower forwards a small set of high-value AWS security events to Sentinel: GuardDuty and Security Hub findings, CloudTrail events that change who can do what or switch off detection, and Bower events that Lambda or ECS applications write to CloudWatch Logs. It does not ship CloudTrail wholesale.
| Step | Where it happens |
|---|---|
| Collect | EventBridge rules and an optional CloudWatch Logs subscription |
| Select | Rule patterns (which API calls, severities) and the aws-security pack policies |
| Arrange | The agent maps events to Bower envelopes; the collector redacts and validates |
| Deliver | Collector queue to the Logs Ingestion API or AMA |
| Prove | bower evidence run as for any other source |
What is forwarded
| Rule | Pattern |
|---|---|
| GuardDuty | GuardDuty Finding with severity 4.0 (Medium) or higher |
| Security Hub | Security Hub Findings - Imported, HIGH or CRITICAL, workflow NEW, record ACTIVE |
| IAM changes | users, access keys, login profiles, policy attachment and versions, roles and trust policies, MFA removal, SAML and OIDC providers |
| Control tampering | CloudTrail stop/delete/update, GuardDuty detector removal, Config recorder stop, KMS key disable or deletion, Security Hub disable, S3 public access and bucket policy changes, snapshot sharing, security group ingress, leaving the organisation |
| Console sign-in | failed sign-ins |
| Root | any API call or console sign-in by the root user |
IAM, root and many sign-in events are emitted only in us-east-1. The forwarder
stack sends them to your home region's default event bus, where the same rules
select them. Events are not stored in us-east-1; they originate there.
EventBridge only receives CloudTrail management events when a trail with logging enabled exists in the account (an organisation trail is fine).
Events
eventType | eventCategory | eventAction | eventResult | Actor | Target |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
aws_cloudtrail | administrative-activity, or authentication for ConsoleLogin | CloudTrail eventName | failure with errorCode, denied for AccessDenied/Unauthorized, failure for a failed console sign-in, else success | username = IAM user, assumed role name or root; userId = principal ARN | Affected IAM user/group/role for mapped permission actions; otherwise aws-api, the service endpoint |
aws_guardduty | application-security | finding type | failure | — | finding, the finding type |
aws_security_hub | application-security | finding Title | failure when compliance FAILED | — | finding, the product ARN |
Event ids are aws- plus a hash of source, kind, record id and time, so a message
delivered twice becomes one queued event. Labels carry aws.accountId,
aws.region, aws.eventName, aws.identityType, aws.mfaUsed, aws.findingType
and similar fields for detections. The original record is not copied into the
event unless BOWER_INCLUDE_RAW_RECORDS=true; CloudTrail request parameters can
hold sensitive values. Long titles are cut to the schema limits on the host.
Mapped IAM permission actions replace the generic API target with the affected user, group or role. They also carry bounded member/permission pairs, exact long identifiers and grant/revoke/replacement direction without raw forwarding. See the permission event catalogue and population matrix for supported actions, conditional/replacement semantics and privacy limits. The direct AWS mapper now defaults raw inclusion off too.
Application events from CloudWatch Logs are forwarded only when a log line is a
Bower envelope (plain JSON, a Lambda JSON log whose message is the envelope, or
text followed by the envelope). Every other line is dropped by the agent.
Deploy
All templates start with rules disabled (RuleState=DISABLED). Validate the
agent and collector first, then update the stacks with RuleState=ENABLED.
# Home region (Sydney or Melbourne; the template refuses other regions by default)
aws cloudformation deploy --region ap-southeast-2 \
--template-file deploy/aws/bower-aws-security.yaml \
--stack-name bower-aws-security \
--capabilities CAPABILITY_IAM \
--parameter-overrides AppLogBucketName=acme-bower-app-logs AppLogGroupName=/aws/lambda/orders
# Global services, in us-east-1
aws cloudformation deploy --region us-east-1 \
--template-file deploy/aws/bower-aws-global-forwarder.yaml \
--stack-name bower-aws-global-forwarder \
--capabilities CAPABILITY_IAM \
--parameter-overrides HomeEventBusArn=arn:aws:events:ap-southeast-2:123456789012:event-bus/default
The home stack creates:
- an SQS queue with SQS-managed encryption, 20-second long polling, a 5-minute
visibility timeout and a dead-letter queue after
MaxReceiveCount(10) deliveries; - a queue policy that only accepts the stack's rules (and the app log bucket), and denies non-TLS access;
ConsumerPolicy, a managed policy withReceiveMessage,DeleteMessage,ChangeMessageVisibilityandGetQueueAttributeson the queue andGetObjecton the app log bucket. Attach it to the agent's role.- optionally, an encrypted, private app log bucket with lifecycle expiry, a Firehose
stream and a subscription filter that only sends lines containing
schemaVersion.
For multiple accounts, deploy the stacks in each account, or send events from member accounts to one security account's event bus and deploy the queue there.
For servers that already run the CloudWatch agent, see Quick start: CloudWatch agent.
Run the agent
The agent is the bower-cloud image (Bower.Agent.Cloud). Run it where it can reach
your collector: an EC2 instance next to the collector, ECS, or EKS.
docker compose -f deploy/docker/compose.cloud.yaml up -d
| Variable | Default | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
BOWER_AWS_SQS_QUEUE_URL | — | QueueUrl stack output. Region and account are read from it. |
BOWER_AWS_REGION / BOWER_AWS_ACCOUNT_ID | from the URL | Needed for VPC endpoint URLs. |
BOWER_AWS_S3_BUCKETS | — | Comma-separated buckets whose notifications may be read. Others are ignored. |
BOWER_AWS_S3_MAX_OBJECT_MB | 32 | Larger objects are dead-lettered. Decompressed size is capped at 64 MiB. |
BOWER_REQUIRE_AU_REGION | false | true refuses a queue outside ap-southeast-2 / ap-southeast-4. Otherwise a warning is logged. |
BOWER_AWS_ALLOW_STATIC_KEYS | false | Long-lived AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID without a session token is refused unless this is set (labs only). |
BOWER_COLLECTOR_URL, BOWER_INGEST_TOKEN(_FILE) | — | As for the sidecar; HTTPS unless loopback or a single-label service name. |
BOWER_BATCH_SIZE | 10 | Messages per receive. |
BOWER_RETRY_SECONDS | 60 | How long a message stays hidden after backpressure. |
BOWER_INCLUDE_RAW_RECORDS | false | Copy original records into attributes. |
Credentials come from the AWS default chain: an EC2 instance profile (set the IMDSv2 hop limit to 2 for containers), an ECS task role, or an EKS IRSA role. No keys are stored in Bower.
Delivery guarantees
- A message is deleted only after every event in it was accepted (2xx) or definitively rejected by policy (400/413/422).
- Collector backpressure (503, 5xx, 401/403, network errors) releases the message
with
BOWER_RETRY_SECONDSvisibility; a 429 is retried in place. - Every received message is leased by elapsed time: on receive the agent sets its visibility to the 5-minute lease and renews it every 2.5 minutes until the message is deleted or released, including while earlier messages in the batch, translation, S3 reads, forwarding or 429 retries are still running. If a renewal fails or the lease deadline passes, work on that message stops and it is neither deleted nor released; SQS redelivers it and the collector deduplicates its deterministic event ids.
- Before each receive the agent probes the collector's
/health. While the collector is unreachable it does not receive, so an outage does not spend delivery attempts and push healthy messages into the dead-letter queue. - Malformed messages are made visible again immediately so SQS moves them to the
dead-letter queue after
MaxReceiveCount. Inspect them there and use SQS dead-letter queue redrive after fixing the cause. - Messages the agent does not understand (another
detail-type, an S3 test event, a bucket that is not allowed) are deleted and counted as unsupported: default deny. - Redelivered messages produce the same event ids and the collector deduplicates them.
The agent logs message ids, counts and failure types only, never bodies.
Pack
Build and load the aws-security pack in the collector:
bower pack build packs/aws-security --key bower-signing.key.pem --out packs-out
# collector
BOWER_PACKS=packs-out/aws-security-1.0.0.bowerpack BOWER_PACK_TRUSTED_KEYS=bower-signing.pub.pem
It holds two policies (BWR-POL-AWS-CLOUDTRAIL, BWR-POL-AWS-FINDINGS), Sigma
detections for root activity, logging and key tampering, access key creation and
console sign-in failures, and samples that must pass before the pack can be signed.
It ships no privacy profile so it can be loaded next to other packs. To pseudonymise
principals, set BOWER_PRIVACY_PROFILE=deploy/privacy/cloud-identities.yaml with an
HMAC key; by default email addresses are masked and secrets redacted.
Limits
- The CloudFormation templates are validated with
ValidateTemplate,cfn-lintand EventBridgeTestEventPatternagainst the test fixtures. CI deploys them into AWS Emulator and runs the agent and S3 output against them; they have not been deployed to AWS by the Bower test suite. - Security Hub's OCSF
Findings Imported V2events are not mapped yet and are dropped. - VPC flow logs and Route 53 resolver logs are parsed by
Bower.Source.Awsbut not forwarded by the agent; they are high-volume network telemetry, not semantic events.