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Cloud permission event catalogue and population matrix

AWS CloudTrail and GCP Cloud Audit Logs carry permission investigation context without raw forwarding. The initiating identity stays in actor; it is never replaced with the identity whose access changed. A denied request describes attempted changes, not effective grants: always query eventResult too.

No envelope schema or DCR change is needed. Existing target, change and attributes objects project to Sentinel Target, Change and Attributes, and are included in RawEnvelope by the default transform.

Population matrix​

All rows use change.field = permission_direction. Only literal grant, revoke, mixed, replace and unknown survive in change.newValue for these cloud event types. previousValue is never populated and remains denied by privacy. Arbitrary before/after values and policy documents remain prohibited.

Event type / actionTargetEntry memberEntry permissionDirection / mode
aws_cloudtrail / AttachUserPolicy, DetachUserPolicyaws-iam-user, requestParameters.userNameAffected user nameExact policyArngrant / revoke, delta
aws_cloudtrail / AttachRolePolicy, DetachRolePolicyaws-iam-role, roleNameAffected role nameExact policyArngrant / revoke, delta
aws_cloudtrail / AttachGroupPolicy, DetachGroupPolicyaws-iam-group, groupNameAffected group nameExact policyArngrant / revoke, delta
aws_cloudtrail / AddUserToGroup, RemoveUserFromGroupaws-iam-group, groupNameAffected userNameGroup name (membership)grant / revoke, delta
aws_cloudtrail / UpdateAssumeRolePolicyaws-iam-role, roleNameEach submitted Statement.PrincipalEach submitted Statement.ActionSummary replace, entries present, replacement
gcp_cloud_audit / SetIamPolicy, or qualified method ending .SetIamPolicy (case insensitive)Existing resource type and resourceNameEach bindingDeltas.memberMatching bindingDeltas.roleADD = grant, REMOVE = revoke; both = mixed, delta
Same GCP action, no delta but request.policy.bindings availableSame resourceEach binding memberThat binding's roleSummary replace, entries present, replacement
Recognised action with no request/delta contextAvailable resource or AWS service endpoint fallbackNoneNoneunknown, unavailable

AWS requires eventSource = iam.amazonaws.com. Other actions/services retain existing mapping. GCP deltas come from protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas, or protoPayload.metadata.policyDelta.bindingDeltas when the former is absent. Deltas take precedence over request policies. An empty delta has mode = delta, newValue = unknown and zero entries; it does not assert a grant.

Selection remains separate. AWS pack 1.1.0 and EventBridge identity rules now include DetachUserPolicy, DetachRolePolicy, DetachGroupPolicy and RemoveUserFromGroup alongside grants. Collector policy tests pin these revoke operations. Rules remain disabled by default until reviewed deployment. Other mapper support does not automatically broaden policy or upstream acceptance.

Compound representation​

attributes["cloud.permissionChanges"] is a structured object, not a string containing an unreviewed source document:

{
"mode": "delta",
"target": "projects/example",
"targetNameTruncated": false,
"entries": [
{"member": "allUsers", "permission": "roles/viewer", "direction": "grant", "conditionPresent": false},
{"member": "allAuthenticatedUsers", "permission": "roles/owner", "direction": "revoke", "conditionPresent": true}
]
}

Member, permission and direction remain associated per entry. Order follows the source; duplicates are not collapsed. AWS entries also carry a fixed memberType: user, role, group, or trust principal kind (AWS, Service, Federated, CanonicalUser, wildcard). Trust entries carry allowlisted effect (Allow or Deny) and conditionPresent.

Trust-policy updates replace the document. Without prior state, removed principals and effective new grants cannot be inferred. present means only that the submitted replacement contains that entry. The same rule applies to GCP replacement snapshots. Conditions are represented by presence alone: expressions, descriptions, external IDs, Sids, etags and other unrestricted values are never copied. Conditional entries must not be interpreted as unconditional access. Negated AWS NotPrincipal and NotAction constructs are rejected rather than misrepresented. AWS trust documents can be objects, JSON strings or URL-encoded JSON strings, with scalar or array statements, principals and actions.

Bounds, privacy and rejection​

  • At most 64 entries per event, including the AWS principal/action cross product. Input binding/member/statement/action arrays are also limited to 64.
  • Extracted identifiers must be nonblank, contain no control characters and fit 2,048 UTF-16 code units. Long policy ARNs and federated principals are preserved without squeezing them into labels or 256-character identity fields.
  • Complete compact JSON-escaped context is limited to 32,768 UTF-8 bytes, leaving room below Azure's 64 KiB field limit for the attributes wrapper and privacy processing. Existing input and output preflight limits still apply.
  • Full target is in cloud.permissionChanges.target. target.name retains the schema's 256-character display prefix; targetNameTruncated = true makes that loss explicit. Do not use a flagged display prefix as an exact resource ID.
  • Invalid shapes, missing required entry fields, unknown delta actions and excess identifiers/entries/bytes reject the whole mapping with a metadata-only typed error. Lists and identifiers are never silently truncated. The cloud host releases malformed messages for retry/dead-letter handling; no partial acknowledgement. Missing source context instead produces explicit unavailable mode.
  • All values still pass secret/PII detectors. Default email masking changes email-shaped principals. Tenants explicitly allowing email retention can preserve those identities exactly; HMAC profiles can deliberately pseudonymise them. Profiles targeting only actor do not automatically cover structured members; configure relevant detector actions too. Custom privacy field-length limits can further shorten identifiers after mapping.
  • Both cloud mapper options default raw inclusion off. The AWS direct mapper previously defaulted it on; the queue agent already defaulted it off. Explicit IncludeRawRecord = true remains a separate opt-in, can exceed output bounds, and is unnecessary for permission context. Keep it disabled in production.

Verification and limits​

CloudPermissionContextTests covers attachment/removal, group membership, trust replacement, both GCP delta locations, multi-binding snapshots, mixed directions, long identifiers, configured/default email handling, canaries and rejection bounds. Accepted fixtures traverse redaction, collector validation, SQLite reopen/lease, ingestion preflight and captured simulated Azure upload. Exact structured context is asserted at each boundary; database files and captured bodies are checked for synthetic secrets. SemanticPrivacyTests pins the fixed direction allowlist and the exact JSON bytes.

These local tests do not prove live cloud collection, selection, deployment or query-verified Sentinel delivery.

Source shapes: AWS IAM API reference, GCP policy history, GCP BindingDelta.