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Pack runtime event catalogue

linux-ssh-gateway 1.1.0 exposes one signed JSON parser (index 0). The source contract is normalized SSH/PAM JSON, with stable original ID, offset timestamp, username, source IP and exact result failure. It produces only authentication_failure, action authentication.attempt, result failure, application ssh-gateway, environment production. Unknown actions stay denied.

Existing BWR-PACK-SSH-AUTH 1.0.0 selects eligible events. The pack privacy profile pseudonymises usernames before persistence. Local rule bower-pack-ssh-auth-failure-001 1.0.0 attaches stable rule hash/version and T1110 metadata to the accepted semantic row. It does not assert an observed password spray aggregate; matching is per event. Unmapped raw fields are discarded. Selected events with ambiguous or over-limit detection fields are quarantined with pack-detection-failed before source persistence; they cannot bypass local detections by adding unrelated labels or attributes. Producer evidence is removed before evaluation and replaced only by locally computed bowerDetections.

linux-journald-ssh 1.0.1 exposes one signed JSON parser (index 0) for systemd journal JSON export records (journalctl -o json). Its transform program extracts account, source address and method from an sshd MESSAGE with a bounded regex, keeps only SYSLOG_IDENTIFIER sshd, maps the method through a static table to the outcome reason and converts __REALTIME_TIMESTAMP (microseconds) to UTC. It produces only authentication_failure, action authentication.attempt, result failure, application linux-sshd, environment production, original ID __CURSOR. Policy BWR-PACK-JOURNALD-SSH-AUTH 1.0.0 selects; usernames are pseudonymised. MESSAGE, host name and other journal fields are never forwarded. A binary (array) MESSAGE is quarantined with transform-type-error. Version 1.0.1 only adds expectFields assertions to its samples; parser, policy and privacy profile are unchanged.

linux-authlog-ssh 1.3.0 exposes one signed JSON parser (index 0) for plain-text sshd auth.log lines from the file tail source. Its transform program matches the whole line with an exact grammar: an RFC 3339 or classic syslog time (impossible dates refused), the sshd[pid] or sshd-session[pid] tag, and Failed <method> for [invalid user ]<user> from <ip> port <n> ssh2. password, keyboard-interactive/pam, none and gssapi-with-mic must end there; publickey must end with exactly a key (optionally a certificate with its key ID, serial and CA key), except that an invalid user's public key failure may end without one. The address may carry an IPv6 scope of at most 15 safe characters, which is not reported. The username and the certificate key ID, the two client-controlled fields, may not contain spaces, so neither can move the reported source address. Not selected: hostbased (its trailer carries a client-chosen user and host) and any other method, usernames or key IDs with spaces, key suffixes on keyless methods, a valid user's keyless public key failure, message repeated, Invalid user, Connection closed, Disconnected, maximum authentication attempts, pam_unix and Accepted lines, other programs and lines without a parseable time. It maps the method through a static table to the outcome reason and converts the time to UTC (classic times are read as UTC in the evaluation year); the read time is never substituted. It produces only authentication_failure, action authentication.attempt, result failure, application linux-sshd, environment production, original ID the file source's file- id. Policy BWR-PACK-AUTHLOG-SSH-AUTH 1.0.0 selects; usernames are pseudonymised. The line, host name and file path are never forwarded. Version 1.3.0 adds the keyless none, gssapi-with-mic and invalid-user public key forms and scoped IPv6 addresses; 1.2.0 replaced 1.1.0's end-anchored match with the exact grammar. The policy and privacy profile are unchanged.

windows-security-logon 1.0.2 exposes one signed JSON parser (index 0) for records from the Windows Event Log source, subscribed to Security event 4625 only. Its transform program explicitly requires the Security channel even if a subscription binds the pack to another channel, and keeps only provider Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing events with data.LogonType equal to 3 (network) and a source address (data.IpAddress must be an address; local console failures with - are not selected) and maps the NTSTATUS data.SubStatus, then data.Status, through a static table to the outcome reason (InvalidCredentials, UnknownAccount, AccountLockedOut, AccountDisabled, AccountExpired, PasswordExpired, PasswordChangeRequired, OutsideLogonHours, WorkstationRestricted, LogonTypeNotGranted, ClockSkew, AuthenticationFirewall, otherwise OtherFailure). It produces only authentication_failure, action authentication.attempt, result failure, application windows-security, environment production, original ID the source's winevt- id. Policy BWR-PACK-WIN-LOGON-FAILURE 1.0.0 selects; usernames (data.TargetUserName) are pseudonymised. Workstation, domain, logon process, computer and the rest of EventData are never forwarded.

Version 1.0.2 narrows selection from 1.0.1: interactive logons and other logon types, including a missing type, are no longer selected even if they carry a valid source address. The failure policy and privacy profile are unchanged. Rejection samples cover interactive loopback logons and missing logon types.

owasp-asvs-app-logging 1.0.0 has no parsers. It selects semantic application events sent to /v1/events with twelve BWR-PACK-ASVS-* 1.0.0 policies (see the ASVS logging pack), and its privacy profile pseudonymises usernames and session ids, removes authentication material and raw input by field name, and replaces CR and LF in every value. Local rules bower-pack-asvs-mfa-factor-removed-001, bower-pack-asvs-authz-stale-grant-001 and bower-pack-asvs-backend-tls-failure-001 (1.0.0) tag matching events per event. database_audit events need a separate signed parser for each audit format; none ships yet.

Other parser configurations without a signed runtime mapping are preview-only. Cloud packs use their existing semantic agent paths and local detections; no new cloud raw parser is activated here. DCR templates remain packaged-only.

See activation, limits, failure codes and Sigma subset. All host demonstrations are local and synthetic. Destination delivery requires a separate authorised query; no Sentinel delivery or all-software coverage is claimed.